This paper examines the relationship between labor compensation and the structure of the product market, which is measured by the industry concentration ratio and by dummy variables for the existence and type of government regulation. Unlike previous studies that have estimated the impact of concentration and regulation on wages or earnings, this study extends the analysis to include the effect of market structure on employer-provided pensions and insurance and on voluntary labor turnover. The hypothesis that product market power raises labor compensation is supported by empirical results indicating that concentration increases wages and fringes but lowers voluntary labor turnover. Regulations that set minimum prices and restrict entry raise labor compensation, since wage premiums due to regulation are not offset by lower pensions and insurance or higher turnover. Other forms of regulation, such as profit regulation in public utilities, are found to reduce labor compensation, as evidenced by higher turnover or lower wages and fringes, or both.
This paper examines the relationship between labor compensation and the structure of the product market, which is measured by the industry concentration ratio and by dummy variables for the existence and type of government regulation. Unlike previous studies that have estimated the impact of concentration and regulation on wages or earnings, this study extends the analysis to include the effect of market structure on employer-provided pensions and insurance and on voluntary labor turnover. The hypothesis that product market power raises labor compensation is supported by empirical results indicating that concentration increases wages and fringes but lowers voluntary labor turnover. Regulations that set minimum prices and restrict entry raise labor compensation, since wage premiums due to regulation are not offset by lower pensions and insurance or higher turnover. Other forms of regulation, such as profit regulation in public utilities, are found to reduce labor compensation, as evidenced by higher turnover or lower wages and fringes, or both.
A LARGE number of studies have examined the impact of product market structure on labor earnings. It has been suggested that firms witb market power pay relatively bigber wages because (1) workers in concentrated industries capture part of tbe monopoly profits, (2) labor costs in concentrated industries can be more easily passed on to consumers, and (3) tbe small number of firms in concentrated industries makes it easier for unions to organize and raise wages. Empirical evidence on tbe relationsbip between concentration and
•James Long is an associate professor of economics at Auburn University and Albert Link is a professor of economics at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, wages is mixed, bowever. Weiss, Masters, Hawortb and Rasmussen, Asbenfelter and Jobnson, and Hendricks find tbat concentration bas no statistically significant effect on wages once industrial characteristics and employee quality are held constant.' In contrast, Dalton and Ford esti- 'Leonard Weiss, "Concentration and Labor Earnings," American Economic Review, Vol, 56, No, 1 (March 1966) , pp, 96-117; Stanley H, Masters, "Wages and Plant Size: An Interindustry Analysis," Review of Economic? and Statistics, Vol, 51, No, 3 (August 1969) , pp, 341-45; Charles T, Haworth and David W, Rasmussen, "Human Capital and Inter-Industry Wages in Manufacturing," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol, 53, No, 4 (November 1971) , pp,376-80; Orley Ashenfelter and George E, Johnson, "Unionism, Relative Wages and Labor Quality in U,S, Manufacturing Industries," International Economic Re- 
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INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW mate that firms in concentrated industries pay higher wages than competitive firms, a relationship Haworth and Reuther find occurring only during cyclical periods of slack demand and stable prices.^ In summarizing the effects of market structure on wages, Hendricks points out that the estimated effect of concentration depends on the control variables and samples used and on the occupations and time periods examined. ' To the extent that government regulation can affect the pricing policies and structure of industries, product market regulation is another potential influence on labor earnings. For example, by limiting the entry of firms into the market, regulation may reduce competition and enable unions to raise wages above the level that would have existed in the absence of regulation. The resistance of firms to demands for higher wages may be increased, however, by regulations that set maximum prices to insure minimum profits. Hendricks investigates the effect of regulation on earnings and finds that annual earnings are lower in regulated industries than in unregulated manufacturing, a result that is consistent with Weiss's findings.^ Nevertheless, labor earnings are relatively higher in industries in which regulatory authorities set minimum prices and restrict entry, as in trucking and airlines.^ Also, Ehrenberg view, Vol, 13, No, 3 (October 1972), pp, 488-507; and Wallace Hendricks, "Regulation and Labor Earnings," Belt Journal of Economics, Vol, 8, No, 2 (Autumn 1977 ), pp, 483-96, 2James A, Dalton and E, J, Ford, "Concentration and Labor Earnings in Manufacturing and Utilities," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol, 31, No, 1 (October 1977 ), pp, 45-60, and James A, Dalton and E, J, Ford, "Concentration and Professional Earnings in Manufacturing," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol, 31, No, 3 (April 1978 , pp, 379-84; Charles T. Haworth and Carol Jean Reuther, "Industrial Concentration and Interindustry Wage Determination," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol, 60, No, 1 (February 1978), pp, 85-95, 'Wallace Hendricks, "Unionism, Oligopoly, and Rigid Wages," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol, 63, No, 2 (May 1981), pp, 198-205, ••Hendricks, "Regulation and Labor Earnings," and Weiss, "Concentration and Labor Earnings," 'See, for example, Hendricks, "Regulation and Labor Earnings," and Thomas C, Moore, "The Beneficiaries of Trucking Regulation," Journal of Law and estimates that telephone industry employees in New York have substantially higher earnings than other comparable employees in the state,T hese studies differ in the data bases, variable definitions, and time periods used, which complicates any direct comparison of their results. Yet, one factor is common to all these studies: they have focused almost exclusively on wages or nominal earnings. None, that is, directly considers the influence of market structure on nonwage compensation such as fringe benefits. Employer contributions to employee pension and insurance plans have grown rapidly in recent years and now average close to 10 percent of wages and salaries; in large manufacturing firms, the percentage is much higher.' Ideally, for estimating the social costs of market imperfections, one would want to know the impact of concentration and regulation on the total (wage plus nonwage) compensation of workers.
Three empirical issues are therefore considered in this paper. First, we examine the impact of market structure on wage levels, using a data base that has some important advantages over those used in previous studies. Second, we analyze the relationship among concentration, regulation, and employer expenditures on private pension and insurance funds. And finally, we estimate the effect of market structure on labor turnover, holding constant the influence of concentration and regulation on wage rates.
Market Structure and Wages
Inadequate control for worker "quality" can bias the regression estimates of the net Economics, Vol, 21, No, 2(October 1978) '"Concentration estimates for the industry categories in the NLS sample were kindly provided by Wallace Hendricks.
"M/IX denotes industries in which maximum prices are regulated (telephone, electricity, gas and steam, water); MIN denotes industries in which minimum prices are regulated and also entry is restricted (air transportation, trucking); and VAR denotes all otber regulated industries (railroad, bus, taxicab, warehousing, water transportation, services incidental to transportation, radio and television, and sanitary). REG includes all of these regulated industries. See Hendricks, "Regulation and Labor Earnings," pp. 485-87, for a discussion of the primary regulatory authority and its powers in various industries. unionization level of 70 percent (the sample mean), wages in high-concentration industries (C equals 70 percent) are 4.75 percent higher than wages in low-concentration industries (C equals 20 percent). In contrast, the wage differential between high-unionization {U equals 70 percent) and lowunionization industries {U equals 20 percent) is 8.8 percent at the mean concentration level of 52 percent.
In Equation 2, the single dummy variable for industry regulation {REG) is replaced by separate variables for the specific type of regulation {MAX, MIN, and VAR). The estimated coefficients of the concentration terms now imply a much larger impact of market power on wages-about a 14 percent wage differential between high-and lowconcentration industries. Controlling for the specific type of industry regulation is thus important in estimating the net impact of concentration on wages, as well as in estimating the union wage effect (which increases to 9.6 percent in Equation 2).
The finding that concentration raises wages is very robust and does not depend on cyclical factors such as high unemployment and stable prices, as suggested by Haworth and Reuther, or on concentration's being less than some critical value, as estimated by Dalton and Ford.'* This conclusion (as well as those of previous studies) should he tempered, however, hy the recognized weaknesses of concentration ratios, including the fact that the industry definitions used in their measurement are arbitrary and do not necessarily conform *Significant at the ,05 level in a two-tailed test, **Significanl at the ,01 level in a two-tailed test.
''Haworth and Reuther, in "Industrial Concentration and Interindustry Wage Determination," find the concentration impact on wages to be positive and significant only during a recessionary period. The year 1966 was one of low unemployment (2,9 percent). When our wage equations were estimated with NLS data for 1971, a year of high unemployment (5,0 percent), the impacts of high concentration and MINregulation on wages were similar to those reported in Table 1 and equally significant, Dalton and Ford, in "Concentration and Labor Earnings," estimate that increases in concentration above the 50 percent level do not affect manufacturing wages. We find that estimating the wage equations with concentration-squared terms leaves the estimated wage differentials between high-and lowconcentration industries virtually unchanged.
to economic markets and also the fact that no information is provided about the market shares of individual firms.
The estimated coefficient of REG in Equation 1 is not statistically different from zero, wbicb indicates that wages do not differ between regulated industries and unregulated manufacturing, once human capital, location, and industry characteristics are held constant. The estimates in Equation 2 substantiate Hendricks's hypothesis that a single dummy variable misrepresents the wage impact of industry regulation.'5 Regulation has no effect, for example, on wages in utility industries in which maximum prices {MAX) are set and entry is restricted, such as the telephone, electricity, gas and steam, and water industries. This finding suggests that the impact on labor costs of "cost price-through" utility pricing schemes is offset by the inflexibility of rate changes due to regulatory lags.'Ŝ etting minimum prices (MIN) and controlling entry into tbe market, on the other hand, raises wages by about 15 percent, suggesting tbat union power in air transportation and trucking is increased by regulations that reduce competition from nonunion labor. Finally, wages are nearly 17 percent lower in railroads, local passenger transit, warehousing, radio and television, and other industries in wbich regulatory practices are more varied {VAR) and have not altered market structure and pricing policies in ways tbat might increase union power.
Assigning the degree and type of regulation to an industry also involves some arbitrary judgments that qualify the inferences drawn from the coefficients of the regulation variables. In addition, a problem in interpreting the coefficient of MIN is that air transportation and trucking are industries characterized by spatial production limitations that act to curb the entry of new firms outside the union's jurisdiction. In long-line trucking, for example, a union firmly established in a few key cities within a region will be protected from nonunion competition because new entrants must almost always operate in the same key cities. Levinson argues that these spatial limitations of production, rather than the control of entry by regulatory authorities, are responsible for the Teamsters' success in raising wages.^'
In this paper, we are unable to determine which entry barrier-spatial production limitations or regulation-is more important in raising wages in air transportation and trucking.'^ Nonetheless, we believe it is important to include the regulation variables in the wage equation, if for no other reason than to serve as controls for estimating the wage impact of concentration.
Since the earnings model includes a number of control variables for worker quality and industry characteristics, the findings in Table 1 suggest tbat employees in highconcentration and M/N-regulation industries receive economic rent in the form of wage premiums. Tbe correct measure for determining whether workers receive economic rent, however, is total labor compensation, wbicb equals wages and salaries plus sucb nonwage compensation as employer-provided fringe benefits (pensions and health insurance), job satisfaction, and employment stability. The impact of market structure on nonwage compensation is '*Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that the latter effect may dominate. Moore, "The Beneficiaries of Trucking Regulation," argues that the operating-ratio regulation in trucking tends to increase labor costs, aside from any additional union strength due to reduced competition from nonunion drivers. Empirically, the annual growth in hourly earnings in trucking has slowed considerably since 1977, relative to earnings growth during earlier years and relative to manufacturing wage increases since 1977. Entry into trucking has been less restricted since 1977, particularly for short-haul carriers, and deregulation policies have been gaining support. Since there is little reason to expect that spatial production limitations have changed radically since 1977, the relatively slower wage growth in trucking may reflect the influence of greater competition.
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INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW examined in the following sections of the paper.
Market Structure and Fringe Benefits
Data on one form of nonwage compensation-voluntary employer contributions for pension and profit-sharing plans and for group health and life insurance-can be derived from U.S. Department of Commerce estimates of employee compensation by industry.'8 In estimating the relationship between market structure and employer expenditures on these fringe benefits, it is important to control for those determinants of fringe benefits that correlate with concentration and regulation. The variables expected to affect fringes have already been discussed in detail elsewhere, so only a brief description of the model is presented here.^"
Fringe benefits should vary positively with total employee compensation because of tbe positive income elasticity of demand for fringes and the positive tax-rate elasticity that results from the preferential tax treatment of fringe benefits.^' Unionization is thought to have a positive effect on fringe benefits, since union leaders can inform their members of the tax advantages of fringe benefits and of the cost savings of group insurance and since employee prefer-"U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, Vol. 59, No. 7 (July 1979) ences for fringe benefits can be directly transmitted to management by collective bargaining. Because of rate differentials between group and individual health or life insurance policies, fringe benefits should vary directly with firm size, assuming the demand for group insurance is price-elastic. Employers may have a preference for certain types of fringe benefits that reduce labor turnover, sucb as nonvesting pension plans or paid vacations whose length increases with tenure. These kinds of fringe benefits are most likely to be offered when turnover costs are high, which is the case if much of employees' human capital is firm-specific.
The impact of concentration and regulation on fringe benefits is obtained by estimating the equation:
FBi =a +bC, +cRi + dXi , where FB, is annual voluntary employer expenditures in 1978 on pensions, profit sharing, and insurance, measured as dollars per full-time employee; C; is the industry concentration ratio; /?, consists of dummy variables indicating the existence and type of regulation, as defined earlier; and the vector X, includes the control variables TOTCOMP (average annual total compensation per employee), FIRMSZ (average firm size), KLRA TIO (the ratio of capital to labor), U (the percent of industry employees covered by collective bargaining), and U'C (an interaction between unionization and concentration). Data for these variables are available for twenty-eight two-and threedigit industries, which include manufacturing, transportation, communication, and public utilities.^^ The ordinary least '^Concentration ratios for two-digit manufacturing industries came from William G. Shepherd, The Economics of Industrial Organization (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1979), p. 202. Concentration data for regulated industries were provided by Wallace Hendricks. For two industries (local and inter-urban passenger transit and trucking and warehousing), it was necessary to average his data for census industries (using industry employment as weights) to match the Department of Commerce industry definitions. Average firm size was measured as the number of employees per establisbment in 1977, as reported in the U.S. Tbe concentration terms are bigbly significant in Equation 1, wbich includes only tbe single regulation variable. Tbe coefficients of C and U'C indicate tbat product market power raises fringe benefits, once unionization exceeds 37 percent.^^ Tbe marginal effects of concentration on fringe benefits are -14, +3, +20, and +37 dollars at unionization levels of 20, 40, 60, and 80 percent, respectively. At a unionization level of 44 percent (tbe sample mean), tberefore, pension and insurance contributions are |320 bigber in bigb-concentration (C equals 70 percent) tban in low-concentration (C equals 20 percent) industries. Wben tbe tbree regulation variables are included in place of REG, as in Equation 2, tbe absolute values of tbe concentration coefficients are diminisbed; but tbe U'C term,bowever, remains positive and bigbly significant. Tbe estimates indicate tbat market power raises fringe benefits at unionization levels above 31 percent; at tbe mean level, employer contributions for pensions and insurance are $425 bigber in bigb-tban in low-concentration industries. Tbe impact of concentration on fringe benefits is tbus mucb smaller tban tbe $1,575 effect due to unionization.^* 1 is subject to simultaneity bias since TOTCOMP includes voluntary employer contributions for fringe benefits along with wages and salaries plus legally required supplements. Gorrecting for this problem, as he suggests, does not appreciably change our estimates of the impact of concentration and regulation on fringe benefits. Gonsequently, the corrected estimates are not reported in the text.
2*Note that the positive and significant coefficient of U'C in Table 2 contrasts with that observed in Table I and in other wage studies. Together, these results indicate that in highly concentrated industries, increased unionization raises the sbare of total compensation allocated to fringe benefits-a finding consistent with the theory and evidence presented by Freeman, "Tbe Effect of Unionism on Fringe Benefits." The tax savings from fringe benefits increase witb concentration; and unions can inform members of the advantages of fringes and make worker preferences concerning the compensation mix known to management.
2*Tbis estimate assumes a concentration level of 49 percent (the sample mean) and a unionization differential of 50 percent (for example, U equals 70 percent relative to U equals 20 percent).
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When measured by a single variable, industry regulation reduces fringe benefits by $627, although the statistical significance of REG is marginal. Equation 2 suggests that the negative effect of regulation on fringes should not be attributed to all types of regulation. Pension and insurance contributions are relatively lower (by |987) only under VAR-type regulation, in which authorities do not consistently restrict entry or set minimum and maximum prices.
We know of no previous studies that have related fringe benefit expenditures to concentration and regulation; consequently, there are no benchmarks against which our estimates can be compared. Moreover, since we use aggregate industry data, our conclusions should be regarded as tentative. In the next section we propose an alternative test to determine the influence of concentration and regulation on nonwage compensation.
Market Structure and Labor Turnover
An alternative method for estimating the effect of market structure on nonwage compensation is derived from the assumption that, other things equal, individuals will quit their present jobs if they perceive that an alternative job offers a net advantage. If concentration or regulation generates positive (negative) economic rent in terms of higher (lower) wage or nonwage returns, workers in concentrated or regulated industries will therefore be less (more) likely to quit and move to other jobs than workers in competitive industries. Interindustry turnover differentials not resulting from wage differences among concentrated, regulated, and competitive industries can thus be assumed to result from differences in nonwage compensation.26 The impact of market structure on labor turnover has not been extensively researched, Hendricks indicates that regulated industries offer more stable employment than manufacturing, and Ehrenberg reports that quit rates are much lower for New York Telephone employees than for workers in manufacturing industries. Nevertheless, neither conclusion is supported by multivariate analysis that controls for nonregulation variables that influence turnover.^'
Other empirical studies have found a significant, negative relationship between concentration and the industry's average annual quit rate. Burton and Parker suggest that quits are inversely related to concentration because (1) the relatively high profits of concentrated industries may allow those firms to use labor in an inefficient (in other words, X-efficient) manner, which may be a characteristic of employment that is attractive to workers; (2) the fewness of firms raises the probability of collusive no-raiding agreements as well as reduces alternatives for intra-industry mobility; and (3) fringe benefits may be higher in concentrated industries.28 Parsons argues that entrance into high-concentration, high-wage industries generally requires investments by the worker, which may diminish the tendency to quit.29
These concentration-turnover findings came from regression models of the form minants of the quit rate (such as pensions, race, gender, and concentration). This specification can be criticized on two grounds. First, using industry aggregates as the units of observation introduces a simultaneous-equation bias because it is ambiguous whether Equation 2 is a supply or demand relationship,'" With individual workers as the unit of observation, however. Equation 2 can be treated as a supply relationship, because the compensation levels facing individual workers are exogenous to them, A second statistical problem is the inclusion of wages as an explanatory variable, Flanagan argues that this introduces multicoUinearity (since wages may be related to race, gender, concentration, and other explanatory variables) and a simultaneity problem (employers may pay lower wages to workers more likely to quit, for example)."
With these problems in mind, we estimate the relationship between market structure and voluntary turnover using the following model specified by Flanagan:'( 3) a = /8o+ J8,(M^.--M^)+ /^2 2,.
where Q, is the quit behavior of the individual, Wi is the individual's current wage, W is the mean market wage for workers with similar human capital and wage-related characteristics, and Z, contains other determinants of quit behavior. The probability of quitting the current employer is assumed, other things equal, to increase as the difference between the actual current wage and the "potential" market wage (hereafter, RESID) decreases. For our analysis, the vector Z includes dummy variables indicating whether the current employer is in a regulated industry {REG, MAX, MIN, or VAR) ; the concentration ratio (C) in the individual's current (three-digit census) industry; unionization {UNION) in the '"For further discussion, see Schiller and Weiss, "The Impact of Private Pensions on Firm Attachment," p, 379, "Robert J, Flanagan, "Discrimination Theory, Labor Turnover, and Racial Unemployment Differentials," Journal of Human Resources, Vol, 13, No, 2 (Spring 1978), pp, 187-207 , "Ibid, current industry; years of work experience with the current employer {TENURE); and dummy variables for married with spouse present {MSP) and race {WHITE).
If high concentration and regulation generate positive (negative) economic rents, the coefficients of C and the regulation variables are expected to be negative (positive) and statistically significant. Since the effects of concentration and regulation on the current wage will be held constant by the RESID term, negative coefficients on the market-structure variables will indicate that concentration and regulation raise nonwage compensation. From previous studies, we expect the quit probability to vary inversely with TENURE, MSP, and UNION and directly with WHITE. Turnover data for individual workers and for the explanatory variables required to estimate Equation 3 were obtained from the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS) of middle-aged men (aged forty-five to fiftynine)," In the NLS, individuals are asked to compare their employers at two consecutive survey dates and to indicate whether any change in employers is due to a voluntary quit or to layoff or dismissal. In the sample of middle-aged males, comparison data on employers are reported for the years 1966-67, 1967-69, 1969-71, and 1971-73 . Labor turnover can thus be measured as a binary variable taking a value of one if a worker quits his or her job in one year and has a different employer in a later year, and taking value of zero if that worker does not change or involuntarily changes employers. Combining data for the four intervals provides a sample of 4,408 observations, including 177 instances of job quitting.
The variable RESID is calculated by subtracting individual workers' "potential" (predicted) wage from their actual wage at the beginning of a time interval. The predicted wage is based on the coefficients from a market wage equation, using the natural logarithm of the hourly wage as the dependent variable and including the following explanatory variables: years of schooling; tenure and its square; unionization; months of job-related training; and dummy variables for health, marital status, race, and geographic region. Since the turnover observations are pooled by time intervals, four separate wage equations are estimated. The wage equation samples are restricted to private wage and salary employees in manufacturing and regulated industries.
Our estimates of the impact of market structure on voluntary turnover are reported in Table 3 ." Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, the quit equations are estimated with probit analysis. The coefficient of concentration is negative and highly significant in both equations, indicating that the probability of quitting decreases as concentration rises. In contrast, the coefficients of regulation (REG) are positive, which indicates that individuals employed in regulated industries are more likely to voluntarily change employers than workers in unregulated manufacturing. Equation 2 reveals, however, that the positive impact of regulation on turnover is statistically significant only for MAX-and VAR-iype regulation.
The coefficients of the remaining variables carry the predicted signs, and RESID, TENURE, and UNION are highly significant. Since including RESID in the quit equation holds constant any "wage differential" incentive for changing employers, the negative coefficient of C in Table 3 suggests that quitting decreases as concentration rises because nonwage compensation is greater in highly concentrated industries than in competitive industries. This finding is consistent with the estimates in Table  2 , which indicate that employer expenditures on pensions and insurance increase with concentration. The results in Tables 2  and 3 '*To determine whether our estimates are biased by pooling different time intervals, we included the national rate of unemployment during the first year of each interval as a crude measure of labor market conditions. This variable was never statistically significant and its inclusion had no effect on the market structure coefficients; it was therefore dropped from the equation. -.0068** (-3.13) . tion industries are relatively more likely to quit because they receive lower fringe benefits than comparable workers in other regulated industries and manufacturing. The insignificance of the MIN terms in Tables 2  and 3 implies that setting minimum prices and restricting market entry raises wages but does not affect other kinds of labor compensation. The coefficients oiMAX suggest that regulation in the utility industries reduces certain kinds of nonwage compensation (other than pension and insurance payments) and, other things equal, results in higher labor turnover.'Ŝ ummary and Implications Previous studies of the effect of concentration and industry regulation on labor compensation have focused predominantly on wages or earnings while ignoring fringe benefits and other kinds of nonwage compensation. Consequently, the implications of those studies regarding the impact of market structure on total labor earnings must be considered tentative. In this study, we have empirically examined the effect of concentration and regulation on labor compensation by estimating the determinants of hourly wages, fringe benefits in the form of employer contributions to pension and insurance plans, and voluntary labor turnover. The regression results reveal a positive and highly significant relationship between concentration and both wages and fringes, and a significant negative relationship between concentration and job quitting. These findings are highly consistent with the hypothesis that, other things equal, labor compensation is relatively higher in concentrated industries than in more competitive ones. Thus, it is rather ironic that certain members of Congress with close ties to organized labor, notably Senator Edward M. Kennedy, have supported legislation intended to reduce industrial concentration in the United States.56 '^These kinds of nonwage compensation could include vacation and sick-leave pay, bonuses, overtime premiums, contributions to savings plans, holiday funds, employee education funds, job security, and job satisfaction. For information on the various kinds of fringe benefits, GPO, 1979) . For additional discussion, see A. F. Ehrbar, "Bigness Industry regulations that set minimum prices and restrict market entry, as in airlines and trucking, are estimated to raise labor compensation by means of increasing hourly wages. This result implies that the opposition to deregulation on the part of the Air Line Pilots Association and the Teamsters has been well founded. The relatively higher incidence of job quitting among workers in the utility industries (telephone, electricity, gas, and water) suggests that profit regulation through the imposition of maximum prices reduces labor compensation. Stronger evidence that certain kinds of regulation may decrease labor earnings is contained in the finding that in the remaining regulated industries, both wages and fringe benefits are relatively lower, wbereas voluntary labor turnover is relatively higher.
The implications of this study for public policies designed to deconcentrate or deregulate industries depend on two issues. First, has labor quality adequately been beld constant in the empirical analyses, so that compensation differentials reflect economic rent rather than payment for some productivity factor? Second, do the empirical findings for mature men apply to other groups of workers as well? If we assume that the relatively higher labor compensation in concentrated and M/N-regulated industries constitutes economic rent enjoyed by the average worker in those industries, then our findings imply that deconcentration and deregulation would reduce unit costs and lead to more efficient resource allocation throughout the economy. The income losses (reduced wages or fringes) incurred by the workers now employed in the affected industries would be more than offset by gains to consumers and other workers.
The assumption that relatively higher labor compensation (or profits) represents economic rent seems more valid in the case of industries in which entry has been artificially restricted by regulation tban in 
